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From the Ground Up:  
What does the evidence tell us about local experiences of 
transitional justice?1 
 
Anna Macdonald 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
a.macdonald1@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract  
Since the early 1990s, transitional justice has established itself as a 
field of study and practice.  Proponents make normative links 
between transitional justice processes—for example, criminal trials, 
truth commissions and reparations—and broader societal and 
systemic outcomes, such as healing, reconciliation, peace and 
                                                 
1 This article is based on an earlier, more detailed report with extensive annexes, 
which can be found on the Justice and Security Research Programme website: 
Anna Macdonald, “Local Experiences of Transitional Justice Mechanisms: What 
does the evidence tell us?” Justice and Security Research Programme Working Paper 6  
(2013). 
The author would like to acknowledge the dedicated team of research assistants at 
the LSE’s Justice and Security Research Programme (JSRP) who helped develop 
this evidence paper project in its early stages: Noemi De Luca, Jillian Feirson, 
Margeaux Fischer, Yuna Han, Rachel Hoff, Vishista Sam, Danielle Stein, Judy 
Taing, Craig Valters, Petar Atanasov.  Thanks also go to Tim Allen, Holly Porter 
and Henry Radice for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Special thanks go 
to Anouk Rigterink who provided invaluable advice and direction on the 
methodology of the paper and to Sarah Jane Cooper-Knock whose careful 
suggestions have strengthened the paper significantly.  This paper also benefitted 
considerably from the comments and insights of Pablo De Grieff as well as Wendy 
Lambourne and an anonymous reviewer. Research for this paper was funded by the 
JSRP with funding from the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID). 
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democracy. There is, however, a paucity of evidence on the actual 
effects and experiences of transitional justice interventions in war-
affected and fragile places.  This paper uses a bibliographic search 
methodology to pull together the extant evidence on local 
experiences of transitional justice interventions and finds that local 
perceptions and experiences of these processes are complex and do 
not conform with widely-held normative assertions about what 
transitional justice “ought” to accomplish.  The implications for the 
transitional justice field are examined and recommendations for 
future research are proposed.   
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of World War Two, Karl Jaspers, the German 
psychiatrist and philosopher, offered a series reflections on what it 
means to confront, cope with, and even recover from, a collective 
history of violence, suffering and mass crime. Against the backdrop 
of the Nuremberg trials, he boldly challenged his fellow citizens: “our 
only chance for salvation lies in total frankness and honesty… this 
path alone may save our soul from the life of a pariah. Whatever 
comes to us we must see it come. This is a daring spiritual and 
political act on the edge of the abyss.”2  When these words were first 
spoken to a university audience in 1946, they encouraged a radical 
exposure to history, to wrongdoing, and to guilt.  Today, the 
sentiments Jaspers expressed have, to some extent, been normalized 
in international relations and diplomacy.  Confronting the past, 
allocating accountability and dispensing justice for wrongdoing at 
critical junctures in a nations history remains a tense, uncertain and 
morally fraught process, but it is a process that has been gradually 
institutionalized and professionalized under the broad umbrella of 
what today we call “transitional justice.”  
Transitional justice is now associated with a set of processes, 
including criminal trials, truth commissions, amnesties, community-
based dispute mechanisms and reparations; and a set of institutional 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Pierre Hazan, Judging War, Judging History: Behind Truth and Reconciliation 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 19. 
2
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.4
  
 
 
 
 
Anna Macdonald  74 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121 
 
structures and regimes, including the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and international humanitarian, human rights and criminal 
law.3  It is also an inter-disciplinary field of scholarly inquiry, offering 
perspectives from political science, anthropology, law, geography, 
sociology and education.4  Since the early 1990s, well over a billion 
dollars has been spent on transitional justice mechanisms.5  The 
former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined 
the UN’s normative commitment to transitional justice in his 
landmark report on the topic in 2004, Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.6  Diplomats, international 
lawyers, politicians and scholars have echoed the refrain that 
transitional justice must be implemented in post conflict places— 
and increasingly in situations of active conflict—not only to ensure 
accountability for odious crimes but also to promote peace, 
reconciliation, truth and societal change.7  In 2011, the World 
Development Report made explicit links between transitional justice, 
security and development and the UN Human Rights Council 
established a mandate for a special rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence of serious 
crimes and gross violations of human rights.8 Access to justice, 
including transitional justice, is now widely regarded as a crucial 
                                                 
3 Alexander Laban Hinton, Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities 
after Genocide and Mass Violence (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 4. 
4 For a thorough conceptual history of transitional justice see Paige Arthur, “How 
“Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31:2 (2009): 321–367; see also Ruti Teitel, 
Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
5 Harvey Weinstein, “Editorial Note: The Myth of Closure, the Illusion of 
Reconciliation: Final Thoughts on Five Years as Co-Editor-in-Chief,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 5.1 (2011): 1. 
6 Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the “Field” 
or “Non-Field”,” International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3.1 (2009): 9. 
7 Leslie Vinjamuri, “Deterrence, Democracy, and the Pursuit of International 
Justice,” Ethics & International Affairs 24.2 (2010): 191–211. 
8 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 2011), 166. 
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component of the post-2015, i.e. post Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) agenda.   
Despite the growth of the field and the proliferation of 
transitional justice practices, we still have a very rudimentary 
understanding of how these interventions actually affect people in the 
fragile and war-affected places where atrocities have been perpetrated 
and experienced. 9  The first scholars to really engage with the “local” 
in transitional justice asked whether “universalistic assumptions about 
the benefits of justice accord with what people think on the ground?” 
and whether “adequate account is taken of non-western cultures and 
beliefs and local practices of justice?”10  Since then, edited collections 
and journal issues have been published that engage closely with how 
transitional justice is viewed from the bottom up, across cases.11  But 
these are areas of inquiry that remain in their infancy.  
A parallel development in the field has been a series of 
quantitative, large-N comparative studies, which employ datasets in 
order to try and establish causal links between transitional justice and 
broader, systemic statebuilding objectives such as peace, 
democratization, and human rights adherence.12   These studies build 
                                                 
9 See for example, Oskar Thoms, James Ron, and Roland Paris, “The State Level 
Effects of Transitional Justice,” Centre for International Policy Studies Working Paper 
(April, 2008); Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey Chapman, 
Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Research, 2009); Special Edition: Transitional 
Justice on Trial: Evaluating its impact, in International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 
(2010): 315-508; Weinstein, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 
5.1 (2011): 1. 
10 Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein My Neighbour, My Enemy: justice and community in 
the aftermath of mass atrocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Laurel 
Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein “Context, Timing and the Dynamics of Transitional 
Justice: A Historical Perspective,” Human Rights Quarterly 32.1 (2008): 165. 
11 Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, Localizing Transitional Justice: 
Interventions and priorities after mass violence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); 
Hinton, Transitional Justice, 4; Special Edition: Transitional Justice and the Everyday, 
in International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.3 (2012): 385-572.  
12 See, for example, Tricia Olsen, Leigh Payne, and Andrew Reiter, Transitional 
Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington DC: United States 
Institute for Peace, 2010); Hun Joon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink, “Explaining the 
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upon the “justice cascade” theory, conceptualized by Ellen Lutz and 
Kathryn Sikkink as a “dramatic shift in the legitimacy of the norms of 
individual criminal accountability for human rights violations and an 
increase in actions (like prosecutions) on behalf of those norms.”13  
The argument follows that since the 1970s, there has been a 
proliferation of national, transnational and international criminal 
accountability for human rights crimes, and that this represents a 
“tipping point,” a moment where “a critical mass of actors has 
adopted a norm or practice, creating a strong momentum for 
change.”14   More recent studies have gone some way towards trying 
to measure the effects of individual criminal accountability for human 
rights abuses and other transitional justice mechanisms and so far, 
they have focused exclusively on macro-level outcomes.  They 
therefore tell us very little about ground level experiences and we 
remain unclear about how, if at all, macro-level outcomes such as a 
human rights prosecution, actually relate to micro-level outcomes. A 
more problematic issue with the large-N, macro-level impact studies 
is that critics have pointed to several methodological and data 
problems plaguing them.15   
In 2011-12, a research team at the Justice and Security 
Research Programme (JSRP), a research consortium based at the 
London School of Economics (LSE), designed a systematic 
bibliographic search methodology in an attempt to pull together the 
extant evidence base on local experiences of transitional justice in 
conflict affected and fragile places.  It is hoped that such an exercise 
will tell us something about how those at the receiving end of 
transitional justice interventions understand, experience and interact 
with these processes.   
                                                                                                             
Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries,” 
International Studies Quarterly 54.4 (2010): 939-96. 
13 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing 
World Politics (W.W. Norton: New York, 2011), 6. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 See Thoms, Ron and Paris for a full review of these studies. 
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The “local” here is understood broadly as studies of the sub-
state—of communities and of individuals—and it is used 
interchangeably with “micro-level.”  Cognizant of the dangers of 
conceptualising the local as a “level” and the implicit connotations 
with “remoteness, marginality and circumscribed contours,” the 
approach here was to borrow from Shaw et al.’s description of the 
local as a “standpoint based in a particular locality but not bound by 
it.”16  Thus, the analytical focus is on those people, or groups, who 
may be the actual or potential victims of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide, and the actual or potential recipients or 
beneficiaries of transitional justice interventions. At the same time, it 
is acknowledged that certain individuals and groups may have the 
agency (power and resources) to shape the transitional justice agenda, 
as well as be subject to it, whether as creators of transitional justice 
(e.g. local level justice and reconciliation institutions), or alternatively 
as perpetrators of injustice.  
At issue is whether internationally promoted and generalized 
concepts (for example “truth,” “justice,” and “reconciliation”), and 
practices (for example truth commissions, trials, and amnesties), 
resonate in the societies in which they are being advocated for and 
implemented today. Some of these places are transitioning politically, 
some are transitioning from war to peace, and others are barely doing 
either. They are places as politically and culturally diverse as 
Columbia, Uganda, Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and Libya. The very 
word “justice” has no direct translation in many of these contexts 
and even where it does, individual and group perceptions about what 
justice actually means can range from access to healthcare to the 
ability to pay for a decent burial.17  
This study carries with it two inherent tensions.  The first is 
between the aim to generalize and the many specific, individual 
contexts examined.   It must be stated then that this examination is 
nascent, not conclusive: it does not seek to impose a summary 
                                                 
16 Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 6. 
17 Tim Allen, Trial justice : The international criminal court and the Lord’s Resistance Army, 
(London: Zed Books, 2006); and Emily Winterbotham, Healing the Legacies of Conflict 
in Afghanistan  (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2011). 
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judgment on whether transitional justice works or not. A positivist, 
results-orientated study would be problematic because it is not 
methodologically sound to compare or generalize across studies that 
are measuring different things in different ways in order to draw 
conclusions about whether transitional justice is, for example, 
“harmful” or “beneficial.”  
The second tension is that this meta-analysis aims to examine 
local experiences through the broad normative lenses of what 
proponents argue transitional justice processes ought to achieve, and 
yet there remains a lack of what development experts and 
practitioners have termed a “theory of change.”18  We still do not 
have a clear enough understanding of who and what transitional 
justice is for and what it is designed to accomplish in any given 
context.19 Therefore, we risk measuring a particular TJ project against 
criteria it never intended to meet.20  It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to make explicit the theories of change to which each TJ 
mechanism may subscribe and then to test whether such a change 
has been delivered.  The approach taken here, more amorphously 
perhaps, is to synthesize some of the broader normative claims made 
about TJ processes and to assemble a guide to the existing empirical 
data, examining what it tells us about how transitional justice 
interventions are understood and experienced locally, and how 
contextual specifics may shape, alter or impact upon these 
interventions. 
 
                                                 
18 Danielle Stein and Craig Valters, “Understanding Theory of Change in 
International Development,” Justice and Security Research Programme Working Paper 1 
(2012);  and Colleen Duggan, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 4.3 (2010): 315–328. 
19 Duggan, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 13. 
20 International Council on Human Rights Policy, No Perfect Measure: Rethinking 
evaluation and assessment of human rights work, (2012), 12. The author would also like to 
thank Pablo De Grieff for highlighting many of the points elaborated in this 
paragraph.  
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Search methodology and findings 
A mixed bibliographic search strategy, comprising three stages, was 
designed and conducted between June 2011 and November 2012.  
The first stage was a database-driven search.  While there are a large 
number of existing databases, those selected for the searches are 
commonly accepted as the most important search engines for social 
sciences and topically the most relevant for the research question.21 
Once the search strings had been devised and the search had been 
conducted, inclusion criteria were applied.22 Only studies published 
after 1983 were selected. This was the date of the first trials of the 
military juntas in Argentina, a point from which the transitional 
justice debate began gaining momentum.23 Only studies published in 
English were selected—this was recognized as a major but 
unavoidable limitation, given resource constraints.  Studies were also 
selected on the basis that they were interrogating the experiences of 
people living in war-affected and fragile locations. The total relevant 
yield from the database searches was 315 articles, books and papers.   
It soon became clear that some key literature, both academic 
and non-academic, was missing from the systematic database-driven 
search.  A second search stage, a “snowball” technique, was therefore 
adopted.  This involved an examination of relevant footnotes and 
bibliographies from the articles, books and papers that the database 
searches had yielded.  The research team also examined the archives 
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice (IJTJ) since its 
creation in 2007 and the “grey” literature produced by the 
International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) since its creation 
                                                 
21 The following databases were selected: SCOPUS, ISI, IBSS, EBSCO (selecting 
Peace Research Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International 
Political Science Abstracts, Race Relations Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Criminal 
Justice Abstracts), African Journals Online, CIAO, Hein Online, West Law, Google 
Scholar, Refseek, LSE Library Catalog, COPAC, and WorldCAT.   
22 For a detailed description of how the search strategy was devised, see 
Macdonald, 11-13. 
23 See for example David Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or Pardon? Human Rights 
Decisions in the Latin American Southern Cone,” in Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional 
Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume 1 (Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), 82. 
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in 2001. Preliminary results were crosschecked against the inclusion 
criteria. The snowball search produced an additional 67 citations.  
Finally, to supplement the database and snowball driven 
searches a peer-led literature review was conducted. This involved 
identifying and selecting peers and authorities in the field, both 
scholars and practitioners. Twenty individuals were contacted with a 
request to identify at least five relevant sources, including books, 
articles, working papers and reports. Six replied and provided a total 
of 27 references (some of which were overlapping).24 The peer-led 
search produced a literature that converged significantly with what 
had been yielded through the previous two searches. In total, it 
produced only 3 studies that had not already been identified. 
Once the three search strategies had been completed, a more 
rigorous screening for inclusion of “local level” empirical data was 
undertaken.  This led to the number of relevant citations being cut 
from 385 to 273.  The 273 sources were then evaluated using an 
evidence-grading template, which had been devised using UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) evidence grading 
guidelines.25  The template was designed to evaluate the literature 
based on the level and quality of empirical data employed to generate 
theories and arguments (<10%, 10-50%, >50%), according to the 
methodology used for data collection (quantitative using existing or 
new datasets; qualitative based on either interviews of observation; or 
“other”).   
Of the 273 journal articles, books, and reports that were 
graded, 32% were coded as containing less than 10% empirical data; 
36% as containing between 10-50% empirical data; and 32% 
contained 50% or more empirical data. Of those books, articles and 
reports that contained more than 10% empirical data, 6.6% were 
recorded as quantitative using an existing data set; 21% were 
                                                 
24 Thank you to Mark Freeman, Hugo van der Merwe, Chandra Sriram, Oskar 
Thoms, Leslie Vinjamuri and Harvey Weinstein for generously sharing their 
recommendations.  
25 This was developed at the London School of Economics (LSE) by Anouk 
Rigterink using the DFID evidence grading guidelines and with input from JSRP 
partners. See “JSRP evidence grading template” in Macdonald, 86. 
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recorded as quantitative using an original dataset; 26.9% were 
recorded as qualitative, observation-based; 56.9% were recorded as 
qualitative, interview based and 34.8% were recorded as “other.” 
These percentages add up to more than 100% because individual 
works were often coded as containing more than one methodology.26 
Overall, then, studies based on primary research were most 
commonly qualitative, employing interview and focus group 
methodologies. The “other” category refers to empirical data derived 
from archival literature, government reports and films, for example, 
and is well represented because it tended to be used as a method in 
conjunction with one of the other four approaches listed above.   
 
 
 
In terms of country and regional distribution of individual 
case studies, a lot of case study material was gathered on the former 
Yugoslavia (13).  If single case studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(9), Serbia (4), Croatia (1) and Kosovo (3) are included, that number 
rises to thirty. This area experienced the first major experiment in 
pursuing justice during conflict in the form of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Regionally, 
Central Africa was the most highly represented area (62). Southern 
Africa (32) and West Africa (31) were also well represented. This is 
perhaps not surprising given that all of the International Criminal 
                                                 
26 As a percentage of all 273 papers, including those with less than 10% empirical 
data, 4.4% were classed as quantitative using an existing data set; 10.3% were 
classed as quantitative gathering own data; 17.6% were qualitative (observation 
based). 37.7% were qualitative, interview based and 23.1% were classed as “other.”  
10
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Court’s official investigations and active cases are in Africa (Uganda, 
DRC, Libya, Central African Republic, Sudan, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Mali); and this is a region that has seen multiple attempts to pursue 
justice after and during mass conflict in contexts where peace 
remains fragile and uncertain.  
 
 
 
Despite this, there was a huge variation in volume of research 
per country, particularly within broader sub-Saharan African regions. 
Rwanda (25), Sierra Leone (24), Uganda (25) and South Africa (24) 
make up the majority of studies in this area, while Central African 
Republic (3), DRC (5) and Kenya (1) were noticeably under-
researched when the literature search was conducted in 2011-12, and 
Chad, another country where transitional justice processes have been 
widely debated, was not represented at all. Although these areas 
probably are under researched it is also likely that some literature was 
not identified because it was not published in English. This may also 
be the case in other places which did not appear to have generated 
much relevant literature, in particular Guatemala (6) and Columbia 
(3). Finally, it was striking that Middle East and North African 
countries (MENA) were so under-represented in the literature. 
Despite transitional justice being a key theme during the Arab Spring 
11
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uprisings, this has been a relatively recent development and the 
searches did not produce any existing literature relevant to the 
criteria.27  
 
 
 
A frequent set of responses to the longer version of this study 
is along the lines of, “Surely there has been something published on 
Lebanon or Nepal?” or “What about the role that identity politics 
play?”  The review is somewhat restricted by its methodology; the 
methodology was designed to be as systematic and transparent as 
possible, comprising a formal search of web-based databases 
complemented with requests to experts in the field to identify key 
literature, and snowball searches of bibliographies and references.  A 
combination of these methods mitigated the shortcomings of each 
but there are still cases where relevant literature may not have been 
captured.   
Below is a summary and analysis of the existing state of 
empirical knowledge on the local experiences and effects of 
transitional justice processes in war-affected and fragile spaces. 
Although reference is not made to every study that the literature 
search yielded, some key works are identified.28 These were selected 
                                                 
27 It is, of course, quite possible that relevant material has been published 
subsequently, although a peer-led search on this area in December 2012 did not 
produce any results.  
28 For a short summary of each study that was reviewed, there is an annotated 
bibliography which can be accessed at 
12
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because they had a strong evidence base (as measured during the 
grading exercise) and/or because they appear to fit or generate 
broader theories.   Selecting particular studies for further examination 
in this way does inject a degree of author subjectivity into the study 
but it also allows for the two criteria above to be met, whilst also 
ensuring some geographic spread in the studies under discussion.   
The analysis of findings is divided up by transitional justice 
process.  Each section begins with an overview of the key normative 
and theoretical debates relevant to each process, followed by a review 
of the evidence based literature.  General findings and conclusions 
are drawn together at the end of the paper.  
 
Trials 
Trials for conflict-related crimes—genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity—can be pursued by various means, including 
domestic courts, hybrid tribunals and international tribunals and 
courts.  Trial advocates argue that widespread benefits will result 
from legal prosecution, including accountability, truth, reconciliation, 
peace, deterrence and promotion of the rule of law. A major 
justification for the creation of the ICTY was the argument that legal 
accountability for war crimes would lead to sustainable peace in the 
region.29  The preamble to the Rome Statute, which established the 
International Criminal Court in 2002, also recognizes a link between 
accountability and peace in its statement, “[r]ecognising that such 
grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
world.”30 Thus trials are perceived to have a retributive and utilitarian 
function: the logic follows that credible threats of punishment will 
change the calculations of potential perpetrators, re-enforcing 
                                                                                                             
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP
6.AnnBib.pdf 
29 Payam Akhavan, “Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A 
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal,” Human Rights Quarterly 
20.4 (1998): 737–816. 
30 Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1 July 2002. 
13
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acceptable norms and consolidating political stability.31  It is further 
argued that formal prosecution will provide an authoritative 
“rendering of the truth,” which subsequently forms a foundation for 
the envisioning and realisation of civil stability and national 
reconciliation.32  Finally, criminal justice, it is argued, serves the needs 
of victims, offering a direct therapeutic and moral response to the 
pain they have suffered.33  
As has been noted, there is very little empirical data to 
support normative and theoretical claims about the benefits of 
domestic, hybrid and international war crimes trials.34  The two most 
powerful and enduring criticisms of war crimes trials are, firstly, that 
such efforts will perpetuate a war or de-stabilize post-war efforts to 
build a secure peace.35 Secondly, that the intersection between law, 
politics and power means that justice will always be compromised in 
favour of political settlements because nations are the actors, the 
legislators, the executives, as well as the judges of international law.36  
                                                 
31 Payam Akhavan, 743-51; Neil Kritz, ed., Transitional Justice: How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, Volume 1 (Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2005), 128; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: 
Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 123; 
Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political 
Transformation,” The Yale Law Journal 106.7 (1997): 2030-1.  
32 Akhavan; Teitel; Kritz; Jaime Malmud-Goti, “Transitional Governments in the 
Breach: Why Punish State Criminals?” Human Rights Quarterly 12.1 (1990): 11-13; 
Diane Orentlicher, ‘settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights 
Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Journal of International Law 100.8 (1991): 2546. 
33 Kritz, 128; Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for 
Justice (London: Times Books, 1998), 49; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Impunity and Human 
Rights in International Law and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
19. 
34 Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein, “Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking 
the Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quarterly 24.3 (2002): 
584. 
35 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Trials and Errors: Principles and Pragmatism 
in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28.3 (2003): 5-44. 
36 Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2009); Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization 
in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Victor 
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What the evidence tells us 
There appears to be a leaning in the local level empirical literature 
towards examining victim-survivor perceptions of trial processes and 
the factors that shape them. These find mixed and interesting results.  
In his interview based study of the Municipality of Prijedor in north-
western Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Refik Hodzic found that 
personal experiences of being included or excluded from the process 
shaped views on the ICTY and the Court of BiH.37  He noted that 
those who testified enjoyed a short-term “therapeutic” effect, while 
those who were excluded, based their views on insufficient or 
incorrect information from the media or word-of-mouth. 38  Despite 
this, both types of victim shared growing scepticism about the ability 
of the ICTY and the Court of BiH to provide justice for victims and 
deter future crimes.39  Studies such as these are, of course, only 
representative of a certain place at a certain time.  One way of getting 
around this limitation is via longitudinal research, so it is encouraging 
that two scholars have undertaken interesting baseline studies in 
Kenya and Cambodia at the outset of international legal proceedings 
in those places.40  
A striking finding across studies is the apparent disconnect 
between international legal priorities, and frameworks, and local 
understandings of justice.  In Timor-Leste, for example, Erica Harper 
analysed 116 interviews with a range of individuals, from the general 
public to employees of UN Transitional Administration in Timor-
Leste (UNAET), and found that local perspectives on evidence and 
                                                                                                             
Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the Struggle for 
State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
37 Refik Hodzic, “Living the Legacy of Mass Atrocities: Victims” Perspectives on 
War Crimes Trials,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8.1 (2010): 123-4. 
38 Ibid., 123-25. 
39 Ibid., 124. 
40 David Backer, Joseph Lahouchuc, and James Long, “Addressing the Post-
Election Violence: Micro-Level Perspectives on Transitional Justice in Kenya,” 
Oxford Working Papers (2010); James Gibson, Jeffrey Sonis, and Sokhom Hean, 
“Cambodians” Support for the Rule of Law on the Eve of the Khmer Rouge 
Trials,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 377–396. 
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due process diverged considerably from those of the UN.41  For the 
East Timorese population, for example, she found that guilt was 
based upon a “shared sense of knowing” rather than an “objectively 
applied” legal process.42  In her study of the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Tara Urs came to similar 
findings.43  Her ethnographic study conducted between May 2005 
and April 2007 involved 117 interviews in rural areas of Cambodia.  
Urs found that 20 per cent of those she interviewed showed 
resistance to engaging with the Court, and noted that people’s 
reluctance was consistent with cultural notions of hierarchy and a 
feeling that the Court was “above” ordinary people.  Furthermore, 
she found that legal concepts such as defence rights, reasonable 
doubt and evidentiary standards were both unfamiliar and alienating 
to the general Cambodian population.44   In a similar vein, Tim 
Kelsall, in an anthropological study of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), noted that the court “failed in crucial ways to adjust to 
the local culture in which it worked.”45  Kelsall noted, for example, 
that the Court ‘sidestepped” the issue of magic and the occult during 
the trial and elected to judge only what it deemed “material.” This 
western-centric view, he suggests, does little to ensure that “judicial 
decisions make sense to the communities in which they are made.”46   
There is very little data in the extant literature to support or 
challenge normative arguments that suggest causal links between 
trials and deterrence, individual and social healing, or reconciliation at 
the micro-level.  In 2004, Eric Stover and Harvey Weinstein 
published My Enemy, My Neighbour, an edited collection which 
brought together ten inter-disciplinary teams over a period of four 
                                                 
41 Erica Harper, “Delivering Justice in the Wake of Mass Violence: New 
Approaches to Transitional Justice,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 10.2 (2005): 
149–185. 
42 Ibid., 165. 
43 Tara Urs, “Imagining locally-motivated accountability for mass atrocities: voices 
from Cambodia,” International Journal on Human Rights 7:4 (2007): 61-99. 
44 Ibid., 70, 77.   
45 Tim Kelsall, Culture under cross-examination: international justice and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 3. 
46 Ibid., 170. 
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years to examine the micro-level impacts of the ICTY and the 
ICTR.47   The editors found no clear links between criminal trials and 
reconciliation.48  They argued that international tribunals worked best 
in conjunction with a variety of other measures including local 
initiatives that proved more attentive to social integration and 
reconstruction and to the needs and wishes of those most directly 
affected by violence.  
Since then, studies which have attempted to understand the 
relationship between trials and peacebuilding and reconciliation—
largely in the context of the ICTY—have come to different 
conclusions. James Meernik, for example, carried out statistical 
analysis of existing monthly time series “event” data, drawn from 
local press reports in Bosnia, from January 1996 to July 2003.49  
Controlling for other factors, he used this to test the effects that 
prominent arrests and verdicts had on levels of inter-ethnic conflict 
and cooperation in Bosnia.50  Meernik found that the ICTY had a 
very limited effect on improving relations among Bosnia’s ethnic 
groups and no statistically significant effect on societal peace. On the 
other hand the actions of the EU and to a lesser extent NATO and 
the US were found to be statistically significant and had a stronger 
impact.  Payam Akhavan reached more positive conclusions.  He 
analysed the ICTY through an examination of political reactions to 
major court decisions and in particular, the indictments of key 
Serbian politicians.51 He found that the Serbian public were largely 
“indifferent” to the indictments and that the ICTY was successful in 
moderating politics and marginalizing ultra-nationalist leaders.52  
Finally, in a series of studies based on multiple research methods 
including surveys, interviews, case studies, oral histories, archival 
                                                 
47 Stover and Weinstein. 
48 Ibid., 11. 
49 James Meernik, “Justice and Peace? How the International Criminal Tribunal 
Affects Societal Peace in Bosnia,” Journal of Peace Research 42.3 (2005): 271–289. 
50 Ibid., 283. 
51 Payam Akhavan, “Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent 
Future Atrocities,” American Journal of International Law 95.7 (2001): 7-31. 
52 Ibid., 13-14. 
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materials and ethnography over a ten year period (1998-2008), Lara 
Nettlefield found that the ICTY had a positive effect on 
democratisation in Bosnia and played a particularly positive role in 
the creation of new post-war political identities based on the rule of 
law and in mobilising civil society groups that lobby for justice and 
accountability.53 
The bibliographic search threw up a number of survey-based 
transitional justice studies.54 The surveys attempt to measure public 
attitudes, perceptions and experiences at specific times, and in 
specific places, where transitional justice policy—and particularly 
trials—are being proposed or have already been implemented. Where 
the sample size is sufficiently large, the surveys can also provide 
comparative information on various constituencies, including, for 
example different ethnic groups within a broader population. With 
varying degrees of success the surveys have attempted to define local 
interpretations of “justice,” preferences for transitional justice 
mechanisms, and how those mechanisms should be administered, e.g. 
locally, nationally or internationally.  
Weinstein et al. offer a general overview of population based 
surveys they have conducted in the Balkans, Iraq, Uganda, and 
Rwanda.55 They found that in all countries, people’s ethnic identity 
strongly influenced their attitude towards trial processes.56 In Bosnia 
Herzegovina, for example, attitudes towards the ICTY were viewed 
through a nationalist lens. Serbs and Croats felt negative about 
judicial proceedings because they believed that their group was being 
singled out for prosecution, whilst Bosniaks expressed more positive 
feelings.57  Local politics also played a key role in shaping responses: 
                                                 
53 Lara Nettelfield, Courting democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Hague Tribunal’s 
impact in a postwar state (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 15. 
54 For a full list of these surveys and a summary of their key findings, see 
Macdonald, 91-96. 
55 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Kaba Kinkodi, and Harvey Weinstein, “Stay the 
Hand of Justice: Whose Priorities Take Priority?” in Localizing Transitional Justice: 
Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence, eds. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and 
Pierre Hazan, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 27-49. 
56 Ibid., 46. 
57 Ibid.; see also Stover and Weinstein. 
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the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) victory in Rwanda, the US 
invasion of Iraq and the relationship between President Museveni’s 
government in Uganda and the International Criminal Court all 
influenced attitudes towards the form transitional justice should take. 
In Rwanda, Uganda, Iraq, Central African Republic (CAR), 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Cambodia, the surveys 
reported a profound lack of awareness of and confidence in formal 
legal structures and this shapes people’s attitudes towards these 
processes.  
Large scale surveys enable us to “recognize the heterogeneity of 
survivors” by examining responses across large geographical areas.58  
By investigating the significance of ethnicity, exposure to violence, 
demographic factors and other crucial differences, patterns begin to 
emerge.  It is often implied, for example, that the practice of 
“forgiving and forgetting” is a cultural given across Africa.  The 
results of three surveys on northern Uganda published in 2005; 2007 
and 2010, however, indicated that something more complex was 
happening.59  The use of certain terms in surveys, can, however, be 
misleading and may lead to ethnocentric interpretations.  For 
example, a 2005 survey in northern Uganda found that 76% of 
respondents felt that those responsible for abuses should be held 
“accountable.”60  To a western audience “accountability” may 
connote a formal legal process.  The respondents, however, specified 
                                                 
58 Stover and Weinstein, 38. 
59 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, Marieka Wierda, Eric Stover, and Adrian di 
Giovanni, Forgotten Voices:  A Population Based Survey of Attitudes about Peace and Justice 
in Northern Uganda, International Center for Transitional Justice and Human Rights 
Center, University of Berkeley (2005); Phuong Pham, Vinck, Patrick Vinck, Eric 
Stover, Amy Moss, and Marieka Wierda, When the War Ends: A population based survey 
on attitudes about peace, justice and social reconstruction in Northern Uganda, Human Rights 
Center, University of California, Berkeley, Payson Center, and International Center 
for Transitional Justice (2007); Phuong Pham and Patrick Vinck, Transitioning to 
Peace: A population based survey on attitudes about social reconstruction and justice in Northern 
Uganda, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley (2010).  
60 Pham, Vinck, Kinkodi and Weinstein, “Stay the Hand of Justice,” 4.   
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that perpetrators could be held accountable through a variety of 
measures including “reconciliation.”61   
 
Truth Commissions 
Truth commission advocates argue that this form of transitional 
justice provides a “narrative” truth rather than a “forensic” one and, 
as such, it achieves a sense of “historical justice.”62 By conducting 
official investigations into past abuses, truth commissions reveal not 
just what happened but also how and why. As Priscilla Hayner has 
argued, a significant advantage of truth commissions “lies in their 
ability to delineate a broad perspective on causes and patterns of 
violence.”63 This, proponents suggest, allows them to go much 
further in their investigations and conclusions than is generally 
possible in any trial of individual perpetrators. Moreover, truth 
commissions—with their analytical focus on state and society—are 
well placed to recommend institutional and legal reforms that might 
prevent future human rights violations.64  It is also argued that truth 
commissions can support other transitional justice mechanisms. They 
can, for example, provide evidence in support of reparations 
policies.65  
As TRCs proliferated in the 1990s, a theory of “truth” was 
developed which highlighted the importance of closing the gap 
between knowledge and acknowledgement of human rights violations 
and mass killings.66  This was supported by psychological research, 
                                                 
61 Pham, Vinck, Wierda, Stover, and di Giovanni, Forgotten Voices, 5.   
62 Tristan Anne Borer, Telling the Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post Conflict 
Societies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); Thoms, Ron and 
Paris, 22. 
63 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 16. 
64 Ibid., 58; Neil Kritz, “Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of 
Accountability Mechanisms for Mass Violations of Human Rights,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59.4 (1996): 141-44. 
65 Kritz, “Coming to Terms, 141-44. 
66 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Introduction,” in Transitional justice in the twenty-first century: 
Beyond truth versus justice, ed. Naomi Roht-Arriaza  (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), 3. 
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especially with torture survivors, which suggested that victims were 
helped by telling their story to a sympathetic listener and that the 
truth was intrinsically important.67  Proponents suggested that the 
cathartic effects experienced by individuals could be transposed onto 
society as a whole and that discovery of the truth would help restore 
social trust and achieve societal reconciliation.68 
The South African TRC has been central in shaping modern 
attitudes towards truth commissions.  As one practitioner remarked, 
after the South African TRC, it seemed as if “the world has become 
besotted with truth commissions.”69  There is, however, a growing 
literature that challenges normative assumptions about truth 
commissions, arguing that these too can be very remote from local 
realities.70  From Peru to Cambodia to Sierra Leone, scholars have 
highlighted the danger of what one termed the “tyranny of total 
recall” in places where, for example, silence has an important social 
function.71 Rosalind Shaw, meanwhile, has traced the genealogy of 
truth commissions and finds their genesis in a western tradition of 
confession that has no immediate resonance in contexts such as 
Sierra Leone, where a factually accurate depiction of the past is less 
important to reconciliation than the “attainment of a cool heart.”72  
On a more practical level, it has been noted that truth commission 
recommendations are often ignored, “not because they are 
unworkable, but because those commissions are inherently weak 
institutions with short life spans.”73 
                                                 
67 Minow, 69; Roht-Arriaza, 4. 
68 Fletcher and Weinstein, 29. 
69 Quoted in Hazan, 33. 
70 Hayner, 186. 
71 Kimberly Theidon, “Editorial Note,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3.1 
(2009): 295. 
72 Rosalind Shaw, “Memory Frictions: Localising the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in Sierra Leone,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1:2 (2007): 
183-207; Kelsall, 14; Kimberly Theidon, “Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics 
of Reconciliation in Postwar Peru,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 433–457.  
73 Lars Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic 
Wrongs,” Social and Legal Studies 21.2 (2012): 1-16. 
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What the evidence tells us 
It is now fifteen years since the South African TRC issued the first 
five volumes of its final report and an abundance of literature has 
been produced in that time. Only a small amount of this is 
empirically grounded work that sets out to understand the local 
experiences of the TRC. The empirical literature is methodologically 
varied, employing representative cross-sectional national surveys; 
longitudinal panel studies, analysis of victim’s hearings and 
ethnographic research. Much of this literature challenges the 
widespread approbation of the South African TRC, chipping away at 
its mythical status and trying to understand in more detail how it was 
actually perceived and experienced by victims, survivors and the 
population at large. The results are mixed but an interesting finding 
across studies appears to suggest that victims and survivors placed 
emphasis on “truth” over “reconciliation” and when the latter 
appeared to be prioritized by the state to the neglect of the former, 
confidence in the process waned.  
A study by David Backer on the TRC is a rare example of 
longitudinal research on a transitional justice process.74  Using panel 
surveys with 153 victims of apartheid era violations conducted in 
2002-3 and again in 2008, Backer captured the effect of the TRC over 
time.  He found that approval of the unique conditional amnesty 
offered by the TRC was at first ‘surprisingly high” (57.5%) but it “fell 
dramatically” by 2008 (20.4%).75  Backer concluded that respondents’ 
earlier support for amnesty was “a reluctant, contingent concession 
that coexisted with a basic interest in seeing at least a degree of 
accountability.”76  Using multivariate regression models, Backer 
found that decline in support for the TRC was most clearly 
associated with an increased feeling that the amnesty was not fair and  
 
                                                 
74 David Backer, “Watching a Bargain Unravel? A Panel Study of Victims” 
Attitudes about Transitional Justice in Cape Town, South Africa,” International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 443–456. 
75 Ibid., 443. 
76 Ibid., 453. 
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a general sense that individualized “truth recovery” had been 
inadequate.    
In a book produced over an eight year period, which brought 
together a series of evidence based contributions from acknowledged 
experts, editors Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe set out 
to respond empirically to the question: did the TRC deliver?77  There 
is a recognition that the TRC contributed to South Africa’s transition 
but the over-arching argument, drawn from the evidence, is that the 
commission veered too far from its most important mandate, which 
was to investigate and understand the causes and consequences of 
political violence in South Africa. Both Hugo van der Merwe and 
Audrey Chapman, in their separate studies of victim hearings and 
human rights hearings, found that support for the amnesty was 
motivated by a desire to find out more information.78   
Another general finding, across studies, was that perceptions 
were largely divided along racial lines. In 2001, James Gibson carried 
out a representative cross-sectional national survey of 3727 
respondents in an attempt to measure the “acceptance” of truth as 
promulgated by the TRC; the awareness of the TRC’s activities; and 
confidence in the TRC.79  A key, underexplored finding was that, of 
the racial groups studied, black South Africans exhibited the highest 
degree of “truth acceptance,” but the lowest degree of 
“reconciliation.”  The lack of correlation between the two highlights 
important connections between truth and reconciliation and 
challenges normative assumptions that the former will lead to or at 
least aid the latter.  In the Chapman and van der Merwe collection, 
                                                 
77 Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
Did the TRC deliver? (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008). 
78 Audrey Chapman, “The TRC’s Approach to Promoting Reconciliation in the 
Human Rights Violations Hearings,” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the 
TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 45; and Hugo van 
der Merwe, “What Survivors Say About Justice: An analysis of victim TRC 
hearings,” in Chapman and van der Merwe, in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 
Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 23. 
79 James Gibson, “Does truth lead to reconciliation?  Testing the causal 
assumptions of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Process,” American 
Journal of Political Science 48.2 (2004): 501-17. 
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meanwhile, Gunnar Theissen’s analysis of public opinion polls 
conducted by research institutions in South Africa between 1992-
2000 found that from the outset opinions on the TRC were divided 
along racial lines, and that these divisions became sharper over time.80   
In both South Africa and Peru—albeit in different ways— 
scholars have identified large gaps between meta and micro narratives 
around truth and reconciliation.  Research suggests that due to 
various political and practical restraints, truth commissions have been 
more effective at developing a “macro truth” of past violations and 
crimes, while neglecting the micro experiences of communities and 
individuals.81 This chimes with the findings of Richard Wilson who 
produced the first major anthropological study of the TRC in 2001.82  
A key finding, based on twelve months of ethnographic study over a 
four year period (1995-98), both “inside” and “outside” of the TRC 
was that the concept of reconciliation was deployed from the top 
down, leaving insufficient ‘space” to discuss commonly held feelings 
of vengeance and  desires for retribution.  In Peru, the national-local 
gap was evident but in reverse.  Kimberly Theidon’s anthropological 
research revealed a disconnect in the confrontational discourse of 
political elites and the micropolitics of reconciliation practiced by 
“intimate enemies” at the local level.83  Around the time of the final 
report of the Truth Commission in 2003, the political leadership were 
distancing themselves from the very notion of reconciliation while 
the Shining Path still existed, whereas Theidon’s own respondents in 
the affected Ayacucho region of the country were developing 
“conciliatory practices” that were “very successful” in terms of  
                                                 
80 Gunnar Theissen, “Object of Trust and Hatred: Public Attitudes Towards the 
TRC,” in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey 
Chapman and Hugo van der Merwe, 236. 
81 Audrey Chapman and Patrick Ball, “Levels of Truth: Macro Truth and the TRC,” 
in Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Did the TRC deliver? eds. Audrey Chapman 
and Hugo van der Merwe, 143. 
82 Richard Wilson, The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the 
Post-Apartheid State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
83 Kimberly Theidon, “Justice in Transition: The Micropolitics of Reconciliation in 
Post-War Peru,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50.3 (2006): 433-457. 
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reincorporating arrepentidos and in “breaking the cycle of revenge” in 
these areas.84 
As was the case with the trial literature, single case studies 
comprise the bulk of the relevant literature on truth commissions. In 
Sierra Leone, Rosalind Shaw questioned whether a truth commission 
was culturally appropriate in a society marked by cultural practices of 
forgetting and moving on.85  In her “multi-sited” ethnography, she 
found that the imperatives of “truth telling,” institutionalized through 
the TRC were often external to Sierra Leonean communities and 
influenced more by global developments in transitional justice than 
by the locally-rooted practices of the participants themselves. Whilst 
those who engaged with the TRC did manage to transform “truth-
telling” into new techniques of forgetting and remembering, even the 
best “creative efforts” could not transform the TRC into a 
mechanism that would respond to local needs.86   
In another study of local understandings, interpretations and 
evaluations of the TRC in Sierra Leone, Gearoid Millar found that 
the primary characteristic influencing perceptions proved to be 
educational status.87  His research was based on ten months of 
participant observation and sixty-two semi-structured interviews with 
the residents of Makeni in northern Sierra Leone.  Millar found that 
non-elites held “overwhelmingly negative” attitudes towards the TRC 
and that this was largely due to a “disconnect between what the TRC 
did and what local people expected of it.”88  Millar argued that “a 
norm in Makeni is that words such as help, support, remember and 
appreciate all mean to provide resources or money.”89 By using such 
terms in its ‘sensitisation” campaign, the TRC was inadvertently 
misrepresenting its role and function.  Interestingly, the study found 
                                                 
84 Ibid., 451, 454. 
85 Shaw. 
86 Shaw, 207. 
87 Gearoid Millar, “Assessing Local Experiences of Truth-Telling in Sierra Leone: 
Getting to “Why” through a Qualitative Case Study Analysis,” International Journal of 
Transitional Justice 4 (2010): 477-496. 
88 Ibid., 498, 492. 
89 Ibid., 492. 
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that the TRC had a much more “positive effect” amongst the local 
educated elite, who comprised an “interconnected group of 
professionals, NGO workers and self-professed “civil society” 
leaders”—all of whom had been “incorporated into the post-war 
NGO establishment.”90  This study suggests that the differentiated 
impact of the TRC in Sierra Leone was partly attributable to 
educational status, the resulting level of exposure to dominant global 
norms and degree to which one can benefit directly from these.  
 
Amnesties 
Amnesties are central to debates about transitional justice and their 
function is highly contingent on circumstances. Christine Bell 
describes how, in Central and South America, where impunity was 
understood as a root cause of recurring conflict, accountability 
measures were regarded as essential to a healthy transition. In 
contrast, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, broad amnesties were included 
in peace deals in recognition that conflicts were caused largely by 
structural conditions including state failure and the privatisation of 
power by warlords.91  
              There is a lively and inconclusive debate amongst 
international lawyers about whether amnesties are permissible under 
international law at all.92 As early as 2000, the UN opposed the 
amnesty provision of the Lomé Peace Accord for Sierra Leone. The 
Rome Statute of the ICC also enables a “claw-back” on amnesty 
where beneficiaries have taken up arms again.93 International human 
rights organisations have argued that amnesties, and particularly 
blanket amnesties, are pernicious: they entrench and encourage 
                                                 
90 Ibid., 493. 
91 Bell, 13-14.  The Lomé Peace Accord was signed in Sierra Leone on July 7, 1999 
and it called for a TRC in exchange for a general amnesty, however, the amnesty 
was repealed after the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.   
92 Louise Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions: Bridging the peace 
and justice divide (London: Hart Publishing, 2008); and Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: 
Amnesty and the Search for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
93 Ibid., 14. 
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impunity and will lead to a recurrence of human rights violations.94 
The evidence suggests, however, that amnesties are still very much a 
part of the “legal landscape.”  Louise Mallinder’s impressive Amnesty 
Law Database demonstrates that despite the so-called “justice 
cascade,”95 over 420 amnesty processes have been introduced during 
the 1945-2007 period, with many of them occurring since the 
establishment of ad hoc tribunals. Indeed, over 66 amnesties were 
introduced between January 2001 and December 2005.96  
 
What the evidence tells us 
One of the striking findings across the evidence-based literature was 
the extent to which experiences of amnesties were contingent on 
other processes. In both South Africa (as has been noted above) and 
Uganda, for example, perceptions towards amnesties appeared to 
alter in the presence (hypothetical or otherwise) of other transitional 
justice processes, including reparations and criminal prosecutions for 
high-level perpetrators.  James Gibson’s survey of South African 
public’s attitude towards amnesty investigated local perception and 
impact.97  The research was based on a nationally representative 
survey of 3727 South Africans conducted in 2000/2001. It was 
designed as a social science “experiment” in which the respondent 
was asked whether amnesty was “fair” for four different categories of 
                                                 
94 For recent examples, see Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: Repeal Amnesty 
Law,” March 2010; available from 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/03/10/afghanistan-repeal-amnesty-law; see also 
Human Rights Watch, “Thailand: No Amnesty for Human Rights Abusers,” 
August 2013; available from  http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/04/thailand-no-
amnesty-rights-abusers.   
95 The “justice cascade” was a term coined to describe the proliferation of 
transnational litigation, institutional change and region-wide policy reform from the 
mid-1980s onwards, in response to the so-called dirty wars in Central and Latin 
America in the 1970s and 1980s.  See Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice 
Cascade: The evolution and impact of foreign human rights trials in Latin 
America,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2.1 (2001): 1-33. 
96 Mallinder, Amnesty, Human Rights and Political Transitions. 
97James Gibson, “Truth, justice, and reconciliation: Judging the fairness of amnesty 
in South Africa,” American Journal of Political Science 46.3 (2002): 540–556. 
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people—people who fought against apartheid; the victims; their 
family and “ordinary people like you”—in four hypothetical 
scenarios. The scenarios were designed to represent principles of 
procedural, retributive, restorative and distributive justice. In both the 
survey and the interview the respondents overwhelmingly found the 
amnesty to be “unfair,” not only to the victims and their families but 
also to “ordinary citizens.”98  Perceptions of the “fairness” of 
amnesty changed by nearly 40 percentage points when other forms of 
justice were present. Monetary compensation for the victims and 
their families had the strongest influence on perceptions of fairness 
in granting amnesties, however, other types of justice—particularly 
procedural (which is defined as the opportunity for victims to discuss 
their injuries publicly) and restorative (apologies)—were also 
influential.99 This study appears to challenge some of the existing 
assumptions regarding truth telling and non-prosecution. It also 
appears to show that ‘strict economic instrumentalism is not the only 
motivating factor in judging amnesty” and people are also concerned 
about receiving symbolic and “non-material” justice.100  
In Uganda, the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University 
(RLP) conducted a survey of local perceptions of the Ugandan 
Amnesty Act, which came into force in 2000.101  The study examined 
the effectiveness of amnesty in achieving long-term reconciliation. 
Conducted in 2005, the survey questioned 409 people who had 
experienced the northern Ugandan conflict first hand. Additional 
interviews were carried out in other areas where the Amnesty Act was 
applied as well as the capital. The study found that the Amnesty Act 
was widely perceived as a “vital tool for conflict resolution” and long-
term reconciliation.102 However, public opinion also demanded 
greater opportunities for truth telling to accompany the amnesty. The 
government’s inconsistent position towards the Amnesty Act and 
                                                 
98 Ibid., 545. 
99 Ibid., 550. 
100 Ibid., 554. 
101 Lucy Hovil and Zachary Lomo, “Whose Justice? Perceptions of Uganda’s 
Amnesty Act 2000,” Working Paper 15, Refugee Law Project (2005). 
102 Ibid., 1. 
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subsequent pursuit of criminal prosecution for high-ranking rebel 
leaders were cited as factors that hindered the Amnesty Act from 
performing its reconciliatory function.  
 
Reparations 
Post-conflict reparations can be both material and/or non-material 
and they may take an individual or collective character. They can 
entail full restitution, compensation, formal apologies, rehabilitation 
and guarantees of non-repetition.103 The status of reparations in the 
transitional justice “toolbox” was boosted by the creation of the 
Victim’s Trust Fund as part of the ICC.104 In theory, request for 
reparation can be directed at any level of society: the state, local 
government, private actors, individual perpetrators of mass atrocity 
or the international community. Reparations programmes, do, 
however, have a very poor implementation record. Of the eighty-four 
transitions that took place between 1970 and 2004, reparations were 
only implemented in fourteen cases.105 
Louise Arbour, the former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and 
ICTR, argues that unless transitional justice provides redress for 
social and economic grievances, it will lack impact and will fail to 
“attack the sources of legitimate grievances that, if unaddressed, are 
likely to fuel the next conflagration.”106 Whilst she is not alone in 
holding this belief, such suppositions remain speculative. On the one 
hand, it has been argued that post-conflict reparations can influence 
reconciliation and social reconstruction at the community level.107  
This is clearly evidenced by the current trend in research and practice 
to develop conceptual links between transitional justice and 
                                                 
103 Pablo De Greiff, ed., The Handbook of Reparations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); Roy Brooks, ed., When Sorry Isn’t Enough (New York: New York 
University Paperback, 1999). 
104 Linda Keller, ‘seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims” 
Reparations,” Thomas Jefferson Law Review 29.2 (2007): 189. 
105 Olsen, Paine and Reiter, 53; Waldorf. 
106 Waldorf, 172. 
107 Quirine Eijkman, “Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional Justice and 
Post-Conflict Reparations,” Global Jurist 10.3 (2010): 8. 
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development, and to supplement the focus on legal-institutional 
reforms with socio-economic interventions.108  On the other hand, it 
has been suggested that reparations programmes can create serious 
tensions between those groups and individuals deemed deserving of 
compensation and those who are not.109   
In an accurate summation of attitudinal survey findings, Lars 
Waldorf tells us that “reparations are the most victim-centred 
transitional justice mechanism.”110  It is abundantly clear from the 
evidence that in almost every survey the search identified, affected 
populations prioritize reparations and compensation over other 
processes including, for example, trials. This may be because both 
monetary and non-monetary reparations are central to the kinds of 
customary justice processes that exist outside of formal state law in 
many contexts. It may also be indicative of a very pragmatic sense 
that criminal justice for “extraordinary” crimes such as genocide will 
not ameliorate the everyday structural injustices that blight people’s 
lives and require some form of socio-economic redress.111  
 
What the evidence tells us 
So, we know that reparations are a popular intervention in theory and 
we also know that they are rarely implemented. Beyond that, we 
know very little about what works, what does not work and what the 
unintended consequences of reparations and compensation for mass 
crimes might be. A common conclusion in evidence-based studies of 
reparations is the need for a better examination of the practical 
design, implementation and impact of reparation programmes.112 In 
Peru, South Africa and Chile, the evidence suggests that reparations 
                                                 
108 Waldorf; Pablo De Greiff  and Roger Duthie, eds., “Transitional Justice and 
Development: Making Connections,” Advancing Justice Series, International Center 
for Transitional Justice (2009). 
109 Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar, eds. Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007). 
110 Waldorf, 177. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Lisa Laplante and Kimberly Theidon, “Truth with Consequences: Justice and 
Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru,” Human Rights Quarterly 29.1 (2007): 
230. 
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programmes were divisive.  Anna Crawford Pinnerup has completed 
the most in-depth analysis of the impact of the South African TRC’s 
policy for Urgent Interim Reparations (UIR), launched in 1998.113 She 
undertook 30 qualitative, semi-structured interviews, roughly half 
with recipients of the UIR and the other half with community leaders 
involved with the process. Victims reported that many of those who 
did not receive UIR, became “jealous or mad”, and sometimes 
“threatened violence.” The majority of those who did receive UIR 
reported increases in family and community conflicts linked to their 
acquisitions. Similar findings were reached in a study in Chile. A 
research team that studied the impact of reparation measures on the 
families of Mapuche victims observed that, in very poor 
communities, economic reparations disrupted family relations and 
negatively affected family and community networks. Those that were 
interviewed felt that non-monetary forms of compensation that had a 
stronger link to cultural conceptions of reparation would have been 
more appropriate.114 In Bosnia, on the other hand, policies of house 
restitution and compensation for property loss appear to have had 
some success, partly because they were attuned to local needs but 
also because they had basis in domestic law and enjoyed international 
support.115 Despite an awareness that reparations and compensation 
are a high priority for victims, we remain unclear about whether 
transitional justice mechanisms are well served to carry out these 
interventions, or whether such a task is better suited to longer term 
development and peace-building programmes, and where, if at all, the 
programmatic links might exist between the two.116  
                                                 
113 Anna Crawford-Pinnerup, “An Assessment of the Impact of Urgent Interim 
Reparations,” in From Rhetoric to Responsibility: Making reparations to the survivors of past 
political violence in South Africa, eds. Brandon Hamber and Tlhoki Mofokeng 
(Braamfontein: Centre for Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2000). 
114 Elizabeth Lira, “The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile,” 
in The Handbook of Reparations, ed., Pablo De Greiff, 55. 
115 Eijkman, 94. 
116 “Donor Strategies for Transitional Justice: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” 
Report of a Workshop held on 15-16 October 2007 in London, convened by UK 
Department for International Development and the International Center for 
Transitional Justice.   
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“Traditional” justice 
The most well-known example of this form of transitional justice is 
the use of gacaca courts in Rwanda to deal with the backlog of cases 
resulting from the 1994 genocide. There has also been a well-
documented debate about the codification of rituals in northern 
Uganda to deal with the violence perpetrated by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) during a twenty-year long civil war, which 
began in 1986.117  What actually counts as “traditional” justice, 
however, remains rather vague. Other adjectives such as customary, 
informal, community based, grass-roots, indigenous and local are all 
sometimes used interchangeably.118  Many activists and some scholars 
believe that traditional justice is not just an alternative or possible 
supplement to more formal transitional justice processes. Rather, 
they take the view that a fully integrated approach is to transitional 
justice is best, one in which conventional legal processes are not 
privileged. The view is premised on the belief that neither formal 
trials nor truth commissions are sufficiently attentive to social 
integration and reconstruction.119  It is also suggested that justice built 
on established customs of reconciliation and compensation is more 
appropriate and practical in close-knit community settings, where 
people remain dependent on continuous social and economic 
relationships with their neighbours.120  
                                                 
117 Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (London: Zed Books, 2006); Adam Branch, “Uganda’s Civil War and the 
Politics of ICC Intervention,” Ethics and International Affairs 21.2 (2011): 179–198.  
118 Tim Allen and Anna Macdonald, “Post Conflict Traditional Justice: A Critical 
Overview,” Working Paper no. 3, Justice and Security Research Programme (February, 
2013). 
119 Joe Alie, “Reconciliation and traditional justice: tradition-based practices of the 
Kpaa Mende in Sierra Leone,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter 
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008); and James Latigo, “Northern Uganda: tradition-based 
practices in the Acholi region,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter 
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008).  
120 Joanna Stevens, “Access to Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of 
Traditional and Informal Justice Systems,” Prison Reform International (2001).  
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The “local” has become positively signified in much of the 
transitional justice literature.  It has been argued that a romantic 
enthusiasm for using traditional justice practices in post-conflict 
settings has created a knowledge gap that has “produced decision 
making based on weak data, ex-ante evaluation and speculation.”121  
Critics have warned against the “facile” embrace of community-based 
processes and have highlighted the unintended consequences of 
reifying and providing external support for local rituals.122  It has also 
been pointed out that traditional processes can be patriarchal, 
discriminatory towards women and young people, and readily 
captured and manipulated by the state in order to advance its 
interests.123 International human rights organisations and legal 
scholars have also raised issues of capacity, questioning whether 
community-based systems are capable of dealing with atrocities 
committed on a vast scale in places like Sierra Leone or northern 
Uganda.  
 
What the evidence tells us 
While customary laws and “homegrown” responses to mass violence 
have been selectively deployed to complement more formal 
transitional justice processes, for example in Sierra Leone and Timor-
Leste, they have also been developed as standalone transitional justice 
mechanisms. It is said that post-genocide Rwanda “responded to 
mass violence with mass justice,, creating 11,000 community courts 
based on gacaca, a modernized form of a traditional dispute resolution 
practice.124  There is a fierce debate around the functioning, role and 
effects of the gacaca courts in Rwanda, and scholars who have 
                                                 
121 Luc Huyse and Mark Salter, “Introduction,” in Traditional Justice and Reconciliation 
after Violent Conflict: Learning from African Experiences, eds. Luc Huyse and Mark Salter 
(Stockholm: IDEA, 2008). 
122 Theidon, “Justice in Transition,” 296; Allen, Trial Justice, 98; Branch, “Uganda’s 
Civil War and the Politics of ICC Intervention.”   
123 Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict; Allen, 
Trial Justice; Lars Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice 
as Transitional Justice,” Temple Law Review 79.1 (2006): 1–88. 
124 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” 3. 
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undertaken extensive fieldwork in the country draw different 
conclusions about community-based justice in this context.  
Broadly speaking both Bert Ingelaere and Lars Waldorf argue 
that the modern gacaca courts are controlled by the Rwandan 
government and have been used by an increasingly oppressive and 
authoritarian state to regulate reconciliation and justice processes 
across Rwanda. Lars Waldorf’s qualitative study is based on in-depth 
fieldwork including interviews with gacaca officials and participants 
and observation of gacaca trials from 2002 to 2006.125 Bert Ingelaere’s 
ethnographic study is based on twenty months of fieldwork in 
Rwandan villages between 2004 and 2009.126 He followed gacaca 
proceedings (over 2000 trials) in ten locations in different areas. 
Ingelaere’s research team engaged with roughly 1,300 “ordinary” 
Rwandan peasants through surveys, focus group discussions, 
individual and life story interviews and informal encounters.  The 
argument follows that the state has interfered in the hearings in order 
to collectivize the guilt of all Hutu and, in doing so, has coerced 
Rwandans into publicly sharing the details of the genocide, thus 
violating a cultural and pragmatic inclination towards silence.127 Thus 
legislation and realpolitik has transformed the original gacaca 
institution into something qualitatively different: spurious legalistic 
procedures, state control and forced participation has meant that the 
modern gacaca process bears only partial resemblance to that on 
which it was supposedly modelled.  
Phil Clark’s research provides a more nuanced picture of the 
discrete communities in which gacaca operated including analysis of 
local personal and power relations and religious and other cultural 
beliefs and practices.128 Clark’s research covered eleven communities 
                                                 
125 Ibid. 
126 Bert Ingelaere, “Does the truth pass across the fire without burning? Locating 
the short circuit in Rwanda’s Gacaca courts,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 
47.4 (2009): 507. 
127 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity,” 7, 78-87; Ingelaere, “Does the truth 
pass across the fire without burning,” 521-25.  
128 Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, post-genocide justice and reconciliation in Rwanda: justice 
without lawyers  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
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in five provinces over the full duration of the gacaca courts.  His book 
draws on 459 interviews with all relevant categories of actors in 
gacaca combining “high” and “low” investigations and including 
multiple interviews with the same individuals over the seven year 
period. Clark also includes analysis from first hand observations of 67 
gacaca hearings.129  Clark’s findings suggest that there is a risk in 
attempting to draw generalisations about local experience, as “gacaca 
in one village can differ enormously from gacaca in another only a 
kilometre away” in terms of conduct, vibrancy of debate and ‘societal 
impact” of the hearings.130 He argues that while it is important to 
recognize the traumatic impact of gacaca for many, the argument 
regarding silence risks essentializing Rwandan culture and stands in 
contrast to his own experience of wide ranging and animated public 
debate at many of the gacaca hearings. Furthermore, in his analysis, 
arguments about the government’s role in gacaca tend to neglect the 
“importance of individual and communal agency in gacaca and the 
vital role of the general population in running and shaping the 
institution, often with highly unpredictable results.”131  
Luc Huyse and Mark Salter’s edited collection provides a rare 
comparative overview of community-based transitional justice 
processes in five African countries: Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique, 
Uganda and Sierra Leone.132  Whereas most edited collections draw 
out general trends in a non-systematic manner, Huyse and Salter 
adopt an empirical case study approach. The methodology of each 
study is different but all research is carried out against a common 
checklist of issues and topics developed by the editors.  Huyse and 
Salter give what they call a “cautious analysis” of “actual” and 
“potential” strengths and weaknesses of traditional justice 
practices.133 They highlight the “relative effectiveness” of traditional 
mechanisms, arguing that indigenous conflict resolution tools do 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 8-9. 
130 Phil Clark, “Book Reviews,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.1 (2010): 
142. 
131 Clark, The Gacaca Courts, 87. 
132 Huyse and Salter, Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent Conflict, 108. 
133 Ibid., 204.  
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have an added value and positive effect particularly with regard to the 
transitional justice goals of healing and social repair.134 One common 
concern, however, across cases, was that traditional justice can also 
reconstitute pre-conflict structures of exploitation. Huyse and Salter 
highlight the persistent ethnic, religious, generational and gender 
hierarchies and divisions that complicate and limit the effectiveness 
of traditional practice.  
It is clear that local rituals and customs are important for 
populations caught up in violent conflict and dealing with its 
aftermath. However it also appears to be the case that those local 
rituals and customs do not form a coherent alternative to formal 
national and international processes and that traditional justice 
cannot be harnessed to the transitional justice agenda in a 
straightforward way.135 A striking finding is the heterogeneity of 
attitudes and experiences towards customs and rituals within and 
between different groups. This should guard against what Adam 
Branch has called the “ethnojustice” agenda, which mistakenly views 
traditional systems of justice as “a single, coherent and positive 
system… universally, consensually and spontaneously adhered to by 
all members of that culture.”136  
A new focus in the transitional justice literature on 
“everyday” methods of social repair in conflict and post-conflict 
communities is perhaps an implicit recognition of the problems 
associated with talking about “traditional” justice and an 
acknowledgement that the term is usually a misnomer.137  This 
represents a departure from a focus on the “traditional” towards a 
more bottom up examination of the “mundane” and unspectacular 
reparative and restorative activities that people in affected 
communities undertake.138  These can include spirit possession and 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 208.  
135 Allen and Macdonald. 
136 Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 163. 
137 IJTJ Special Issue 6.3. 
138 Pilar Alcala and Erin Baines, “Editorial Note,” International Journal Transitional 
Justice, 6:3, (2012): 386. 
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ritual cleansing; community exhumation; silence, forgetting and 
forgiveness. The emphasis in the literature is not on whether these 
processes are effective or ineffective but rather that they are often the 
only game in town; they are what is actually happening outside of the 
narrow reach of international and state-sanctioned transitional justice 
processes.  
This literature also tells us what happens when formal and 
external transitional justice norms and processes interfere with or 
engage with local beliefs and practices.   Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf 
and Pierre Hazan’s volume, Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions 
and Priorities after Mass Violence, goes further than any other in 
providing an analytical framework to understand the “local” in 
transitional justice.139 They use a place-based approach to depart from 
the “model of collision” between the local and the universal to a 
“model of engagement.”140  This underscores the importance of 
exploring the complex encounter between international norms, 
national agendas and local practices in particular contexts.141  The 
collection itself includes qualitative, ethnographic, participatory and 
interview-based analysis in nine diverse countries, ranging across 
Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East 
and South East Asia. It also examines a range of transitional justice 
mechanisms, from truth commissions to trials to “customary” 
practices.  
As well as noting the shifting perspectives of justice over 
time, and the potentially important role of silence, which is 
sometimes the “only form of security to which people have access,” 
the editors identify general trends in local engagement with 
transitional justice.142  In particular, risk is inherent in imposing the 
“victim” and “perpetrator” dichotomy in intrastate conflicts 
originating in part from structural violence. In the case of Uganda, 
Sierra Leone and Peru, the authors found that this legalistic division 
had adverse effects on truth-telling, peacebuilding and reconciliation 
                                                 
139 Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan. 
140 Ibid., 5. 
141 Ibid., 3. 
142 Ibid., 11. 
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efforts.143  This finding ties into other research, which argues that 
people often occupy “ambiguous victim-perpetrator statuses” which 
include bystanders, collaborators, informants, forced perpetrators, 
forced combatants, victims turned perpetrators, perpetrators turned 
victims.144  Shaw found that in Sierra Leone, the perpetrator/victim 
categories failed to recognize the complexity of the “moral grey 
zones” of the civil war; increased ethnic animosities; and neglected 
the underlying ‘structural violence,” which caused the war in the first 
place.145 
 
Multi-mechanism and “holistic” transitional justice 
For both normative and practical reasons, scholars and policymakers 
now tend to see the range of potential transitional justice mechanisms 
as conceptually complementary.  Scholars and others have questioned 
the efficacy of narrow prosecutions without any institutional effort to 
promote a broader historical understanding of events; the value of 
truth commissions to victims without any scope for legal redress; the 
risk that reparations might be interpreted as “blood money” without 
some corresponding form of accountability; and the appropriateness 
of international judicial structures without corresponding national 
and local accountability processes.146  There is an appreciation that 
the broader aims of transitional justice will only be met by what one 
scholar refers to as the “interweaving, sequencing and 
accommodating (of) multiple pathways to justice.”147 The desire for a 
holistic approach is essentially an aspiration whose applicability and 
efficacy has rarely been tested. As so often in discussions of justice, 
normative notions of what is inherently believed to be right shape 
perceptions, rather than evidence about what has been occurring.  
However, it has also been suggested that more pragmatic motivations 
may also be in play: a more “holistic” approach encompasses broader 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 8-9. 
144 Erin Baines, “Complex political perpetrators: reflections on Dominic Ongwen,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 49 (2009): 164; Theidon, “Editorial Note,” 451.   
145 Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 144.   
146 Fletcher and Weinstein. 
147 Roht-Arriaza, 8. 
38
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.4
  
 
 
 
 
Anna Macdonald  110 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121 
 
peacebuilding and development objectives, which tend to be better 
funded.148  
It is striking that despite a general consensus on the need for 
a “holistic” approach there are very few studies that interrogate the 
interplay and impact of multiple transitional justice mechanisms in 
particular contexts. Many studies make reference to corresponding 
processes but there have been few attempts to systematically analyse 
the micro-level effects of deploying a package of measures 
simultaneously. There is also a lack of information about how 
transitional justice processes interact with concurrent development 
and peacebuilding programmes, for example security sector reform 
(SSR) or rule of law (RoL) initiatives. This is despite a call from both 
scholars and practitioners for policy areas and programming to 
become less hermetic.149 What the current evidence tells us is that the 
relationship between different processes can be difficult and that this 
can result in competition, tension and mistrust.  
 
What the evidence tells us 
In Timor-Leste, Elizabeth Stanley’s interview-based study concluded 
that, while the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
(CAVR) achieved a high level of participation and made a “vital 
contribution to peacemaking” at first, its “good” work was slowly 
“downgraded” by the failings of other transitional justice initiatives 
and particularly the “inability to challenge Indonesian impunity or 
provide redress for serious crimes.”150 The trial process was perceived 
as deeply flawed: most of the convicted were low-level combatants 
rather than the “big fish” Indonesian officials who orchestrated the 
repression; investigative units were poorly resourced; judges 
incompetent and proceedings a ‘shambles.”151  Elizabeth Drexler 
                                                 
148 Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past,” 172. 
149 Ibid.; see also Chandra Sriram, Jemima Garcia-Godos, Johanna Herman, and 
Olga Martin-Ortega, Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-
Combatants, (London: Routledge, 2012).   
150 Elizabeth Stanley, Torture, Truth and Justice: The Case of Timor Leste (New York: 
Taylor & Francis, 2008), 131-2. 
151 Ibid., 92. 
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came to similar findings in her anthropological examination of the 
“dense interconnections between institutions and representations” of 
transitional justice in Timor-Leste.152  Drexler analysed three 
transitional justice institutions, the ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta; the 
internationalized Special Panels; and the CAVR.  She found that both 
the tribunal and the Special Panels supported a “civil war” narrative 
that focused on threats to Indonesian national integrity and state 
sovereignty. As such they became “theatres for military impunity,” 
creating feelings of frustration and antipathy amongst Timorese.153 
The CAVR meanwhile, was criticized by individuals who felt under 
pressure to accept statements from perpetrators that “were not as 
complete or remorseful as they had hoped.”154  Both studies share the 
conclusion that the conditions that enabled mass violence to occur in 
the first place also structured the transitional justice process, and that 
the underlying causes of the violence “remain invisible in official 
institutions and representations of historical and legal truth.”155  
Nicola Palmer’s work on post-genocide Rwanda examined the 
practices of international, national and localized criminal courts and 
argued that although compatible in law, in practice “the result has 
been a stratified and at times competitive set of criminal courts.”156 
Her research draws on in-depth analysis of ICTR judgments as well 
as 146 semi-structured interviews with judges, lawyers, witnesses and 
suspects from the ICTR; the national Rwandan courts; and the gacaca 
community courts. Her interpretative cultural analysis revealed how 
the judges and lawyers of each court tended to have “divergent” 
interpretations of the role and objectives of transitional justice in 
Rwanda. The ICTR was concerned with developing international 
                                                 
152 Elizabeth Drexler, “Addressing the legacies of mass violence and genocide in 
Indonesia and East Timor,” in Genocide: truth, memory and representation, eds. 
Alexander Laban Hinton and Kevin Lewis O’Neill (Durham: Duke University 
Press: 2009), 219-247. 
153 Ibid., 225, 228. 
154 Ibid., 229. 
155 Ibid., 203. 
156 Nicola Palmer, “Transfer or Transformation? A Review of the Rule 11 bis 
Decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” The African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 20.1 (2012): 3. 
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criminal case law and the national courts were more focused on 
domestic legal reform, meanwhile while gacaca personnel saw the role 
of local courts as providing a historical or “truth” account of the 
genocide. This important and unique research examining the 
interplay of different transitional justice mechanisms in Rwanda via 
interviews with those directly involved in the process highlights the 
challenges of effective cooperation and complementarity where a 
“package” of transitional justice processes is deployed.  
 
General Findings and Conclusions 
Local perceptions and experiences of transitional justice processes are 
complex and do not conform with widely held normative assertions 
about what transitional justice “ought” to accomplish.  A review of 
evidence-based literature exposes normative and theoretical claims 
about the benefits and disadvantages of transitional justice as 
simplistic, inaccurate and sometimes misleading.157  The evidence 
base is made up primarily of qualitative interview based and 
ethnographic work, a lot of which is high quality; and public attitude 
surveys, some of which employ sophisticated quantitative techniques. 
Despite this, there have been insufficient attempts to combine 
diverse methodological and epistemological approaches to the study 
of transitional justice. Individual pieces of research can be very high 
in quality but the overall picture is less satisfying. Once the evidence 
is reviewed, we are left with a patchwork, fragmented understanding 
of how transitional justice is understood and experienced in local 
spaces.  Perhaps this is to be expected, given the highly context 
specific nature of both the atrocities committed and the way in which 
transitional justice interventions may be experienced in any given 
locale.  Despite this, the final section will draw together some general 
findings from the evidence review, many of which were touched 
upon above but will be elaborated on more below.  
                                                 
157 See Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 3-26; Hugo van der Merwe, “Delivering Justice 
During Transition: Research Challenges,” in Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, 
and Audrey Chapman, Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical 
Research (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 115-143, 129.  
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Translating concepts 
The ethnographic evidence tells us that the concept of justice is very 
difficult to translate. In many fragile and conflict affected places, the 
term “transitional justice” has little currency or resonance. In 
Acholiland in northern Uganda, for example, an area where 
transitional justice debates became particularly tense after the ICC 
issued its first ever arrest warrants for five Lord’s Resistance Army 
commanders in 2004, there is no word for “justice.”158 Any research 
design that enforces concepts, imposes definitions or whitewashes 
crucial contextual differences is clearly problematic.  It perpetuates a 
troubling hierarchical paradigm, which understands the local as the 
static receiver of global norms and knowledge. A more accurate and 
honest starting point is to understand, through a deep contextual, 
cultural and linguistic engagement with ordinary people, local notions 
of justice related concepts. This requires creativity and a willingness 
to re-examine preconceived ideas. It may require reframing the 
questions that researchers have asked in the past: it may, for example, 
be easier to get at an understanding of senses of “injustice” than 
“justice” or it may be more practical to begin by asking people about 
locally recognized concepts around “not being treated the right way”, 
“revenge” or the notion of needing to “cool” pain in one’s heart.159 
To date, this kind of approach has been lacking in a lot of transitional 
justice research. The result is that the dominant transitional justice 
narratives articulated by donors, the UN and human rights NGOs 
have largely marginalized the voices of ordinary people.   
 
                                                 
158 Allen, Trial Justice,16. 
159 See for example Emily Winterbotham. During the pilot phase of JSRP research 
in northern Uganda in August/September 2012, the research team had numerous 
discussions with local researchers and experts about how to define and 
conceptualize “justice.” In general it was found that the concept of “injustice” was 
easier to think about.  
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Measurement problems 
It is true that the “great rush”160 to results-based evaluation of 
transitional justice is ill advised but it is also important to 
acknowledge that transitional justice does not lend itself easily to 
assessment. As Colleen Duggan has described, the current demand 
for linear cause-effect linkages is problematic and “attribution 
obsession” has led to an unhelpful focus on “impact data often at the 
expense of process.”161 Demonstrating that transitional justice 
processes have achieved or failed to achieve a range of social goals in 
highly complex environments where multiple interventions are on-
going is a daunting research task. Clearly, difficulties related to 
understanding impact afflict all policy interventions but transitional 
justice does appear to suffer these measurement problems acutely. 
Even when the scorned linear “cause-effect” approach is set aside 
and replaced by context-sensitive and systems approaches, 
understanding and attributing effects and experiences remains very 
challenging.  
It is important to identify why this may be the case and what 
transitional justice policy makers and scholars can do about it. Clearly 
the assumed, yet often untested transitional justice “outcomes” 
including, for example, “peace” or “accountability” or a ‘sense of 
justice” are much more amorphous than certain interventions in say, 
education or health policy, where an indictors such as literacy rates or 
maternal mortality are more quantifiable. But this is still not getting 
to the crux of the matter.  There is a fundamental, existential problem 
with transitional justice: it does not really know what it is. There are, 
as Paige Arthur has argued, “no clear theories of transitional justice 
and the term has no fixed meaning.”162 It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to delineate what and whom transitional justice is for and 
what it is meant to achieve.163  
                                                 
160 ICHRP, 12. 
161 Duggan, 323. 
162 Arthur, 359. 
163 For contrasting views on the coherence of transitional justice as a “field” of 
study and practice see Bell, above, and Pablo De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional 
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This problem is compounded by the fact that transitional 
justice policy lacks a clear “theory of change,” that is, it has no clear 
understanding of how change works. Therefore, even if ends are 
identified, it is unclear how we get there.164 This contributes to the 
“basket approach” that scholars, campaigners and practitioners take 
towards transitional justice. The broad parameters of a normative 
imperative exist; all that awaits is the substance that will bring it to 
life. So, everything and anything can be piled in, from criminal 
accountability, to societal healing, to socio-economic redress, to ritual 
cleansing. The intentions of proponents are generally good and the 
research is sometimes based on evidence but over-burdening 
transitional justice without revising it conceptually risks turning this 
sub-discipline, field or “non” field into a basket case. There is a big 
analytical leap between saying, “this is what transitional justice should 
do” and, “this is what transitional justice is capable of doing.”165   In a 
recent special edition of the International Journal of Transitional 
Justice, for example, the editors discuss the possibilities for “re-
conceptualising transitional justice to consider the practices and 
processes with which people live through violence and seek to make 
sense of and resist violence.”166  It is not clear whether the authors 
mean that transitional justice should be equated with everyday 
practices and processes of social repair, or whether it should simply 
take them into account.  If the former, a word of caution is necessary.  
We lack information about how communities recover after mass 
violence, and in particular, we lack information about the 
contribution that transitional justice plays in this process.  
Transitional justice, although rather fluid and hard to define, is still a 
loaded term with specific meanings attached to it.  Anachronistically 
subsuming all reconstructive practices under the transitional justice 
framework may distort their meaning and may misrepresent the 
societies in question.  This is not to undermine the importance of 
                                                                                                             
Justice,” in Nomos vol. LI Transitional Justice, eds. Melissa S. Williams, Rosemary Nagy 
and Jon Elster  (New York: NYU Press, 2012). 
164 van der Merwe, Baxter and Chapman; Duggan.   
165 Waldorf, “Anticipating the Past.” 
166 Alcala and Baines, 387. 
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“everyday” modes of social repair; on the contrary, understanding 
these processes is essential – but they do not need the transitional 
justice label assigned to them in order to provide validity or 
legitimacy.  Often, links may exist between these processes and 
macro transitional justice narratives; but in other cases, such links will 
be harder to substantiate.   
 
Methodological and epistemological divides 
A lack of theoretical and conceptual reflection has meant that 
transitional justice has become a term of “wholly uncertain 
meaning.”167  In a recent article, Timothy Garton Ash raises similar 
points about the notion of “multiculturalism.”  The questions he asks 
could equally be applied to transitional justice: “Does it refer to a 
social reality? A set of politics? A normative theory? An ideology?”168  
We do not really know and until there is more reflection and dialogue 
around these central questions, it will be hard to understand what 
policies described as transitional justice are really supposed to 
achieve.   This pressing task is by no means impossible, but it will 
require academics and practitioners to be willing to reconsider the 
ground on which their work rests, rather than simply defend their 
“turf” and its inclusion within the paradigm. 
Without strong conceptual roots and a solid theoretical 
grounding within which to situate analysis, and without clarity on 
intentions, scholars tend to direct their attention arbitrarily to the 
level of social or institutional structure that they are interested in or 
that they would like to see transitional justice efforts address.169 
Scholars interested in institutional design and implementation of 
truth commissions may orient their focus towards an analysis of the 
final report’s reception. Success here is often defined by the extent to 
which the commission fulfilled its mandate. Those interested in 
                                                 
167 Timothy Garton-Ash, “Freedom and Diversity: A Liberal Pentagram for Living 
Together,” New York Review of Books (November 2012). 
168 Ibid. 
169 Geoff Dancy, “Impact Assessment, Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role 
for Positivism in the Study of Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 4.3 (2010): 361. 
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macro-level state analysis concentrate on whether accountability 
processes have aided or jeopardized peaceful transitions and 
democratic consolidation.  Micro-level studies, meanwhile, focus on 
sub-state, community and individual perceptions and experiences of 
transitional justice.  
Leading on from this is a methodological and epistemological 
divide in transitional justice research. Macro-level research focusing 
on the linkages between TJ and systemic properties such as regime 
stability or democratic consolidation tends to be positivist; is much 
more likely to employ quantitative techniques; and is also more likely 
to contain a comparative element.170 Micro-level research which 
examines local engagement and responses to transitional justice tends 
to be qualitative; is much more likely to have an interpretative 
approach and is therefore rarely comparative in any systematic sense. 
Because studies “vary sharply” in both epistemology and 
methodology, it is very difficult to “coordinate or talk about 
important lessons that have been learned so far.”171  
Ethnographic studies provide a strong analytical basis for 
understanding the “local” in transitional justice but they are only 
illustrative and findings are often at odds or contradictory even for 
research that is undertaken in the same locality. There is very little 
comparative research interrogating how transitional justice plays out 
at the sub-national level, especially across communities and 
administrative units, as well as between rural and urban areas.172 
Broadly speaking, ethnographies tend to present a negative picture of 
transitional justice processes, perhaps because the analytical emphasis 
is on the need to complicate and problematize existing “top-down” 
approaches to transitional justice. The focus tends to be on the 
cultural and political difficulties in implementing transitional justice 
policies and a critique of methodological processes that do not take 
sufficient account of local contexts. A general shortcoming in 
                                                 
170 Thoms, Ron and Paris; van der Merwe, Baxter and Chapman.  
171 Dancy, 366. 
172 David Backer, “Cross National Comparative Analysis,” in Assessing the Impact of 
Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research, eds. Audrey Chapman, Hugo van 
der Merwe and Victoria Baxter (Washington, DC: USIP Press), 23. 
46
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 4
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss3/4
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2015.1.3.4
  
 
 
 
 
Anna Macdonald  118 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.3, 2015, 72-121 
 
qualitative, interpretative work is that despite a general call to recast 
and remodel transitional justice policy and institutions, none of the 
studies employ research techniques that demonstrate conclusively 
that transitional justice has a decisively negative impact at the micro-
level.173  
With ethnographic approaches there is also a risk of settling 
for a description of local realities and an abjuration of clumsy 
international interventions without an interrogation of problems 
associated with everyday practice. The everyday is also a site of 
violence, contestation and discrimination.174 There is a danger in the 
ethnographic work and particularly in the “everyday” approach to 
understanding transitional justice that scholars are making a virtue of 
necessity. The literature highlights a need to describe what is actually 
happening on the ground. The conclusion commonly drawn is that 
policymakers need to engage more seriously with the practical justice 
provision that is part of people’s everyday realities in ordinary places. 
But beyond that, there is little sense about whether these processes 
are locally desirable or whether they are more aptly described as 
locally present.  There is not much clarity on whether the everyday 
practices that are being described are regarded as interim measures 
that exist in the absence of a functioning state or as a viable, long-
term formula for contextually relevant accountability and 
reconciliation.  
Meanwhile, large-N data-driven positivist research, claims to tell 
us broadly whether accountability mechanisms decrease human rights 
abuses, for example, but cannot tell us why, how or when. Those 
causal mechanisms and dynamics can only be understood through a 
deep contextual engagement with the underlying social, political and 
economic dynamics in any given place. Indeed, despite an increase in 
large-n, macro-level impact assessments, there has been little effort to 
understand whether positive findings in relation to, for example, 
democratisation and rule of law actually percolate down to the micro-
                                                 
173 Shaw, Waldorf and Hazan, 3; Dancy, 371.  
174 Alcala and Baines; Tim Allen and Laura Storm, “Quests for therapy in northern 
Uganda: healing at Laropi revisited,” Journal of Eastern African Studies 6:1 (2012): 22-
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level.  We are unclear about whether effects diverge, converge or bear 
little, if any, relationship across levels of society.175 The fact that a 
transitional or post-conflict regime has a new human rights 
framework tells us very little about whether society as a whole is on a 
new trajectory and in particular how communities and individuals 
understand and perceive these changes and whether this is reflected 
in everyday activity and behaviour. It is perfectly plausible that the 
same policy may have positive macro-level effects but negative 
micro-level effects; the potential of amnesty legislation to lead to 
such an outcome has been widely suggested.  This does, however, 
provide interesting opportunities for future mixed methods and 
mixed epistemological research.  For example, if analysis of a dataset 
tells us that human rights prosecutions improve human rights 
protections, this can and should explored further by in-depth 
qualitative work, on the ground, which examines local perceptions 
and experiences of these apparent improvements and changes.   
 
Over-reliance on snapshots and surveys 
With important exceptions, the evidence-based literature does not 
provide a strong sense of the dynamic effects transitional justice 
processes over both the short and long term. There is a serious lack 
of baseline data which is a problem endemic in most social science 
research.176  Perhaps worryingly, public attitude surveys are referred 
to frequently in the transitional justice literature as “evidence” of 
timeless public perceptions, priorities and as a barometer for the 
success of initiatives.  Cursory reference to findings in these surveys 
often appears as a “nod” to including the “local” in research.  These 
studies face several limitations, however—not least that they 
represent a ‘snap-shot” in time—and should not be viewed as 
definitive, enduring assessments of public attitudes towards peace 
and justice. Research that captures circumstances, attitudes and 
behaviour before a transitional justice process is initiated will allow 
for a more accurate assessment of actual impacts on a variety of 
                                                 
175 Thoms, Ron and Paris, 6. 
176 Duggan, 322. 
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social environments and sectors as the time goes on. The few 
longitudinal studies that do exist provide a valuable insight into how 
effects develop over time and—in some cases—how long term 
impacts can deviate substantially from short-term outcomes.  
 
Neglected themes 
Given the broad consensus that transitional justice should comprise a 
“package” of measures and the existence of simultaneous TJ 
measures in countries such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Timor-
Leste, it is surprising that there is so little analysis examining the 
interplay, role and impact of multiple processes at the national level, 
let alone the sub-national level. This is an area in which transitional 
justice scholarship is failing to keep up with transitional justice policy 
and programming. Recently, systematic quantitative comparisons 
have provided a better gauge of the relative impact of different 
combinations of measures on systemic macro-level properties. 
However, the vast majority of qualitative single and comparative 
studies concentrate on a single mode of transitional justice. Whilst 
the evidence review prioritizes an understanding of the local it is also 
acknowledged that that some of the most interesting questions for 
practitioners are about how transitional justice is experienced across 
the political and social spectrum in any given context and how these 
experiences fit together. 
Although the evidence base for assessing the local 
experiences of transitional justice policy is generally limited, there is a 
particular lack of empirical research on certain themes. There is a 
stark lack of research on the experiences of women, children and 
minorities in transitional justice programmes. As yet we have a poor 
understanding of the differentiated impacts of these processes on 
specific groups.177 We do not have a clear understanding of the 
relationship between transitional justice policy and the media. We 
lack research on the role that the media plays in transitional justice 
debates at the local level. There is very little empirical research that 
makes the connection between transitional justice and other 
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peacebuilding interventions at the micro level. Again, this is 
surprising given that transitional justice is commonly implemented 
alongside other peacebuilding and security measures, including DDR, 
SSR and rule of law measures. Studies that do exist suggest that the 
relationship between transitional justice and DDR/SSR is a 
complicated one and provide a clear agenda for further research. 
Linked to the above is a lack of clarity on how transitional justice 
policies are experienced by perpetrators and ex-combatants. This, 
again, is surprising because conceptually, a central dilemma in 
transitional justice is the need to balance consideration for victims 
and survivors with the reality that former perpetrators may be a 
source of resistance and backlash. 178 Understanding the way in which 
the latter experience, engage with and are affected by transitional 
justice should be a pressing concern for transitional justice scholars. 
Finally, it is important to point out that presently, the transitional 
justice knowledge base relies on a biased country sample.179 Scholars 
and policymakers risk drawing lessons from a handful of well-
documented examples that are not transferrable across cases. A 
corollary is that certain countries where transitional justice processes 
have been proposed or implemented are seriously under-researched: 
these include Lebanon, Central African Republic, Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Chad.    
 Research into transitional justice has undoubtedly progressed 
rapidly in the last three decades, but many questions still remain. To 
answer them, we not only need to expand our field of analysis, we 
also need to question the assumptions, paradigms, and frameworks 
that have brought us this far. 
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